

Index to Volume 44

Alperovich, G. The economics of choice in the allocation of inter-governmental grants to local authorities	285
*Austen-Smith, D. Comment on the Ledyard Paper	43
*Bailey, E.E. Comment on the Papers by Theodore Keeler and Barry Weingast	197
Brams, S.J. <i>See</i> Fishburn, P.C.	
*Breton, A. An analysis of constitutional change, Canada, 1980–82	251
*Coughlin, P.J. Expectations about voter choices: Comment on the Ledyard Paper	49
*Courchene, T.J. The political economy of Canadian constitution-making: The Canadian economic-union issue	201
Cox, G.W. Electoral equilibrium in double member districts	443
Cullis, J.G., Jones, P.R., and Thanassoulas, C. Are charities efficient ‘firms’? A preliminary test of the UK charitable sector	367
Denzau, A., and Grier, K. Determinants of local school spending: Some consistent estimates	375
Deutsch, J. Philanthropic motives and contribution policy: A note	501
Dougan, W.R. Railway abandonments, cross-subsidies, and the theory of regulation	297
Fishburn, P.C., and Brams, S.J. Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences	397
Gill, H.L. <i>See</i> Haurin, D.R.	
Grier, K. <i>See</i> Denzau, A.	
Hansson, I., and Stuart, C. Voting competitions with interested politicians: Platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter	431
Haurin, D.R., and Gill, H.L. The spatial distribution of public services: A structural model of voting, educational production, and the government’s allocation of educational inputs	481
Jones, P.R. <i>See</i> Cullis, J.G.	

* Carnegie papers on political economy, Vol. 4.

*Kalt, J.P. Comment on the Weingast Paper	193
Kats, A. Can a party represent its constituency?	453
Kau, J.B., and Rubin, P.H. Economic and ideological factors in congressional voting: The 1980 election	385
*Keeler, T.E. Theories of regulation and the deregulation movement	103
Kilgour, D.M., and Levesque, T.J. The Canadian constitutional amending formula: Bargaining in the past and the future	457
Lächler, U. The political business cycle under rational voting behavior	411
*Ledyard, J.O. The pure theory of large two-candidate elections	7
Levesque, T.J. See Kilgour, D.M.	
Lichbach, M. An economic theory of governability: Choosing policy and optimizing performance	307
*McKelvey, R.D., and Ordeshook, P.C. Rational expectations in elections: Some experimental results based on a multidimensional model	61
Mehay, S.L. The effect of governmental structure on special district expenditures	339
*Meltzer, A.H., Romer, T., and Rosenthal, H. Introduction	1
Ordeshook, P.C. See McKelvey, R.D.	
Romer, T. See Meltzer, A.H.	
Rosenthal, H. See Meltzer, A.H.	
Rubin, P.H. See Kau, J.B.	
*Sproule-Jones, M. On the analysis of constitutional change in Canada: Comment on the Breton and Courchene Papers	279
Stuart, C. See Hansson, I.	
Thanassoulas, C. See Cullis, J.G.	
Weede, E. Democracy, creeping socialism, and ideological socialism in rent-seeking societies	349
*Weingast, B.R. The congressional-bureaucratic system: A principal-agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)	147
*Winer, S. Comment on the Papers by Thomas Courchene and Albert Breton	273

REVIEWS

Brams, S.T., and Fishburn, P.C. <i>Approval voting</i> (G. Tullock)	389
Herring, R.J. <i>Land to the tiller: The political economy of agrarian reform in South Asia</i> (J.D. Reid, Jr.)	391
Jackson, P.M. <i>The political economy of bureaucracy</i> (W.S. Peirce)	392
McLean, I. <i>Dealing in votes: Interactions between politicians and voters in Britain and the USA</i> (D.R. Lee)	393
Tullock, G. <i>Economics of income and redistribution</i> (E. Ames)	395

